A Thought On Parshas Kedoshim
A Thought On Parshas Kedoshim
"...lo sasu avel ba'mishpat...b'tzedek tishpot ami'secha..."
"... do not pervert justice...judge your people fairly..." (19:15)
This verse seems straightforward in its imperative for those who serve as judges to follow a just and strict ethic. A dayan or shofet or zaken - anyone who assumes authority in ruling on matters of Jewish law - must be impartial, objective and adhere to parameters of integrity.
An element of the verse which is not as straightforward is its grammatical structure. The first clause is written in the plural, as if speaking to a group of judges: lo sasu is second-person plural for "you shall not pervert justice." The later clause, however, shifts to second-person singular, as if addressing a solitary judge: tishpot - judge - is singular.
Rabbeinu Chaim Paltiel notices this change in the verse and analyzes it. Why would the Torah begin speaking to a group and then downshift to an individual here? He suggests that this is a hidden allusion to a pair of laws which have been introduced by Chazal. Our sages have noted that in addressing many matters pertaining to financial claims, and disputes involving business transactions, a court made of three intelligent laymen may convene if both litigants agree to this. These are known as hedyotos - a court of one's own peers, and have been referred to by Chazal almost euphemistically as "gimel ro'ae bakar" - three cowboys. As long as they are G-d fearing men who have a solid understanding of the issues involving the business dispute, they can serve as "judges" on that case. It is not always practical, nor necessary, our sages teach, to insist on a formal din Torah involving the complex perusal of learned scholars. Some matters can be dealt with by one's peers.
In contrast is the circumstance where two litigants can opt to seek an alternative to the formal din Torah by seeking arbitration from a lone expert. Rather than going before an official bais din tribunal, people may opt to select a single chocham mumcheh to arbitrate a matter within the framework of halachic adjudication. This is also an option, along with the "three cowboys" choice, when litigants seek to resolve a financial matter.
Now, one might think that once we have veered past the formal setting of a bais din and have opted for one of these convenient alternatives, the rules are relaxed and there is no longer a strict imperative to remain objective and straight. Perhaps those who arbitrate can rely on various tools and devices to adjudicate a case as they see fit. Perhaps there is a rationale for "situational ethics". Can the rules be bent to fit the demands at hand?
Rabbeinu Chaim Paltiel hastens to observe that our verse suggests otherwise! The first clause, which speaks in plural, is referring to those alternative situations where "three cow-
boys" preside. It is written in plural to allude to their collective responsibility to preserve justice. The latter clause, written in the singular, incorporates those situations where a yachid mumcheh is appointed to settle the matter. He too must function with integrity and objectivity. With this insight, we now understand the precision of the verse saying "those people who settle disputes: they must not pervert the system and he must rule justly."
Once again, Rabbeinu Chaim Paltiel brings to light the wisdom of the Oral Torah through a careful analysis of the Written Word. Good Shabbos. D Fox
"...lo sasu avel ba'mishpat...b'tzedek tishpot ami'secha..."
"... do not pervert justice...judge your people fairly..." (19:15)
This verse seems straightforward in its imperative for those who serve as judges to follow a just and strict ethic. A dayan or shofet or zaken - anyone who assumes authority in ruling on matters of Jewish law - must be impartial, objective and adhere to parameters of integrity.
An element of the verse which is not as straightforward is its grammatical structure. The first clause is written in the plural, as if speaking to a group of judges: lo sasu is second-person plural for "you shall not pervert justice." The later clause, however, shifts to second-person singular, as if addressing a solitary judge: tishpot - judge - is singular.
Rabbeinu Chaim Paltiel notices this change in the verse and analyzes it. Why would the Torah begin speaking to a group and then downshift to an individual here? He suggests that this is a hidden allusion to a pair of laws which have been introduced by Chazal. Our sages have noted that in addressing many matters pertaining to financial claims, and disputes involving business transactions, a court made of three intelligent laymen may convene if both litigants agree to this. These are known as hedyotos - a court of one's own peers, and have been referred to by Chazal almost euphemistically as "gimel ro'ae bakar" - three cowboys. As long as they are G-d fearing men who have a solid understanding of the issues involving the business dispute, they can serve as "judges" on that case. It is not always practical, nor necessary, our sages teach, to insist on a formal din Torah involving the complex perusal of learned scholars. Some matters can be dealt with by one's peers.
In contrast is the circumstance where two litigants can opt to seek an alternative to the formal din Torah by seeking arbitration from a lone expert. Rather than going before an official bais din tribunal, people may opt to select a single chocham mumcheh to arbitrate a matter within the framework of halachic adjudication. This is also an option, along with the "three cowboys" choice, when litigants seek to resolve a financial matter.
Now, one might think that once we have veered past the formal setting of a bais din and have opted for one of these convenient alternatives, the rules are relaxed and there is no longer a strict imperative to remain objective and straight. Perhaps those who arbitrate can rely on various tools and devices to adjudicate a case as they see fit. Perhaps there is a rationale for "situational ethics". Can the rules be bent to fit the demands at hand?
Rabbeinu Chaim Paltiel hastens to observe that our verse suggests otherwise! The first clause, which speaks in plural, is referring to those alternative situations where "three cow-
boys" preside. It is written in plural to allude to their collective responsibility to preserve justice. The latter clause, written in the singular, incorporates those situations where a yachid mumcheh is appointed to settle the matter. He too must function with integrity and objectivity. With this insight, we now understand the precision of the verse saying "those people who settle disputes: they must not pervert the system and he must rule justly."
Once again, Rabbeinu Chaim Paltiel brings to light the wisdom of the Oral Torah through a careful analysis of the Written Word. Good Shabbos. D Fox
posted by Rabbi Dr. Fox at 9:27 PM
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